Digital Blue Line SRL

Aviation Security Training – Course Book

Cargo Only Operations

Flight and cabin crew implementing in-flight security measures

Ed.1, Rev. 00

Disclaimer

This training course has been developed based on the provisions of the Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Regional Development of the Republic of Moldova No. 85 dated 14 May 2025, approving the National Training and Certification Program for Personnel in the Field of Aviation Security, as well as the applicable national and international aviation security regulations.

The content of this course is intended to support compliance with the regulatory framework in force and does not replace official legislation, regulatory acts, or instructions issued by the competent authorities. In the event of any discrepancy, the provisions of the applicable legal and regulatory documents shall prevail.

How is this course structured?

This course is designed for flight and cabin crew implementing in-flight aviation security measures, in accordance with the approved national training and certification requirements.

Modules Included

The course is structured around the following core aviation security modules:

- Module 9 – Aircraft Security;
- Module 10 – Aircraft Security Search;
- Module 19 – Handling of Potentially Disruptive Passengers.

These modules collectively ensure that crew members acquire the knowledge, skills, and competencies required to identify threats, apply preventive measures, manage security incidents, and respond effectively to emergencies related to aviation security.

Passenger-Related Content – Scope Limitation

Although the regulatory framework includes references to passenger-related security procedures**,** modules and lessons specifically addressing passenger handling are not detailed in this course**.**

This is intentional and justified because:

- The airline does not operate passenger flights;
- The operational profile is cargo-only;
- Passenger screening, disruptive passenger handling, and passenger management; procedures are not applicable to the airline's activities.

Only those elements that may remain theoretically relevant (e.g. general threat awareness or human behavior indicators) are addressed at a high-level, without operational passenger procedures.

Duration and Training Cycle

- Assessment: written examination with a minimum pass mark of 75%;
- Initial training**:** required before assignment to operational duties;
- Recurrent training**:** at intervals of no more than 2 years, focusing on regulatory updates, lessons learned, and changes in security threats or procedures.

Sensitive Security Information Familiarization

What is Security Sensitive Information SSI?

SSI contained in aviation security measures and procedures are not intended for public access and are protected against unauthorized access by limiting their distribution, in accordance with the "need-to-know" principle.

Given that, in accordance with the definition set out in Article 3 of Law No. 192/2019, access to SSI is restricted, such information shall be marked with the designation "Sensitive Security Information".

> The SSI protection system is established within THE AIRLINE for the purpose of preventing, counteracting, and eliminating risks and threats to the security of information classified as SSI.

How do we decide which information should be classified?

The classification of information as SSI is carried out taking into account its importance for aviation security interests and the consequences that could arise (including potential damage) as a result of its loss or unauthorized disclosure.

Which documents are classified as SSI within THE AIRLINE?

Within THE AIRLINE, the following documents and information are classified as Sensitive Security Information (SSI) due to their direct impact on the effectiveness of aviation security measures and the potential risks associated with unauthorized disclosure:

1. **Aviation Security Program (ASP)**
   The ASP defines the structure, responsibilities, and measures implemented to protect aircraft, crew, cargo, mail, and ground operations against acts of unlawful interference.
2. **Detailed Procedures Related to the Implementation of Aviation Security Measures**
   This includes step-by-step operational procedures describing how security measures are applied in practice.
3. **Information and Details Regarding Aviation Security Incidents**
   Reports, analyses, and records related to actual or suspected aviation security incidents.
4. **Contingency Plans Related to Acts of Unlawful Interference**
   Plans describing response actions, coordination, and escalation procedures in the event of security threats or incidents.
5. **Drawings, Images, and Videos Depicting Security Arrangements**
   Visual materials showing security screening checkpoints, security equipment, access points to security restricted areas, and other sensitive locations that could reveal vulnerabilities.

6. Aviation Security Quality Control Results
Results of internal and external inspections, audits, assessments, and oversight activities related to aviation security.

Basic rules in respect of ISS:

1. Access to Sensitive Security Information (SSI) is strictly limited to only those positions that require such information to perform their official duties, in accordance with the "need-to-know" principle.
2. All functions authorized to access SSI are formally recorded in the Register of Functions Requiring Access to SSI, which is maintained under the responsibility of the Security Manager.
3. Translated version of ISS documents are classified as ISS.
4. If any part of the document (e.g. a page or a Section or an Annex) includes security sensitive information, then the whole document is classified as ISS.

Obligations of the persons having access to SSI

A person who has access to Sensitive Security Information (SSI) is obliged to:

1. not allow the disclosure, by any means, of information classified as SSI that has been entrusted to them or has become known to them in connection with the performance of their functional duties;
2. comply with the requirements for the protection of SSI;
3. inform the Security Manager about any occurrences or any circumstances that hinder the protection of SSI.

Any violation of the normative provisions regarding the protection of SSI shall result in disciplinary liability in accordance with the applicable legislation, with strict disciplinary sanctions being imposed due to the high seriousness of the disciplinary offence concerned.

Rules for Marking SSI Material Carriers

1. The preparation of documents containing information classified as SSI, as well as their reproduction, shall be carried out in a strictly limited number of copies.
2. All documents containing information classified as SSI shall be mandatory marked with the designation "Sensitive Security Information", clearly separated from other markings, in red.
3. The designation "Sensitive Security Information" shall be applied to all copies of the document, in the upper right-hand corner of the title page and on each individual page of the document.
4. Each document shall be assigned a registration number, which shall be indicated on all copies of the document and its annexes. The registration number shall be followed by the designation "SSI", and the date of registration in the record register shall be mandatory indicated.

Handling and Transmission of Sensitive Security Information (SSI)

1. Core Principle: "Need to Know"

Sensitive Security Information (SSI) must only be shared with persons or entities who genuinely need the information to perform their duties.

✓ Share SSI only if the recipient is authorized;

✗ Never share SSI out of curiosity, convenience, or "just to have a look".

Rule to remember:

If the recipient does not need the information to do their job, they must not receive it.

2. Who May Send and Receive SSI?

✓ SSI may be sent and received only by persons who are authorized to access SSI;

✓ Both the sender and the recipient must have SSI access rights;

✓ Unauthorized persons must never be involved in handling or transferring SSI.

3. Sending Paper (Hard Copy) SSI Documents

When transmitting physical SSI documents:

✓ Use sealed, opaque, and durable envelopes;

✓ Ensure the envelope cannot be seen through or easily damaged;

✓ Clearly identify the authorized recipient only.

✗ **Do NOT** send SSI documents by:

- Regular post;
- Fax;
- Unprotected or open delivery methods.

4. Sending Electronic SSI Documents

When transmitting SSI in electronic format:

- Never send SSI as plain text by email or messaging platforms;
- The electronic file must be password-protected;
- Use a strong password (not obvious or reused);
- The password must be shared separately, not in the same email or message as the file.

5. Internal Transmission Within the Same Building

Within the same building:

- SSI documents may be transmitted in one closed envelope;
- The envelope must contain only the recipient's name;
- Delivery must be performed by a person who has authorized access to SSI.

What Staff Must Never Do

✗ Never leave SSI documents unattended;

✗ Never photocopy or forward SSI without authorization;

✗ Never discuss SSI in public or unsecured areas;

✗ Never send SSI through unsecured email or messaging apps.

6. Destruction of SSI – What Must Be Done

Paper SSI:

Paper documents containing SSI (including drafts, working notes, and unused copies) shall be destroyed when no longer required, under controlled conditions. Registered SSI documents may be destroyed or sent for recycling only after a formal destruction record is approved, in the presence of at least two authorized persons with SSI access, and all actions must be properly recorded.

Electronic SSI:

Electronic files containing SSI shall be permanently deleted when no longer required, ensuring they cannot be recovered, and any backups or duplicate copies must also be removed. The deletion of registered electronic SSI shall be documented in the same manner as paper SSI, ensuring traceability and accountability.

Module 09 – Aircraft Security

1. Lesson 1 - Aircraft access control measures

Module Learning Objectives

The purpose of aircraft access control measures is to prevent acts of unlawful interference by ensuring that only authorized persons, vehicles, and items gain access to the aircraft at all times when it is on the ground or during operational stops.

Unauthorized access to a cargo aircraft presents a direct risk of sabotage, placement of prohibited articles, or compromise of the secure cargo supply chain.

1.1. Protection and prevention of unauthorized access to the aircraft

General Rule – Applicable at All Airports

Regardless of the parking location at an airport, all external aircraft doors shall be protected against unauthorized access at all times. Protection is achieved either by ensuring that any person attempting unauthorized access is promptly challenged or by keeping the external doors closed. This requirement applies throughout all ground operations, including cargo handling, technical stops and unscheduled parking.

When the aircraft is positioned in a critical part of the airport, external doors that are not accessible from the ground may be considered closed provided that all access aids have been removed and positioned sufficiently far from the aircraft to reasonably prevent access.

For the Boeing 747-400 Freighter, particular attention shall be paid to the upper deck cockpit access and the main deck cargo door area, as the presence of stairs or loaders directly compromises the security status of the aircraft.

When the aircraft is parked overnight, additional measures include the removal of access aids, and sealing. Under no circumstances shall the aircraft be left unsecured.

Aircraft shall be sealed | Stairs shall be removed | Persons shall be challenged

Crew Responsibilities

Flight crew play a key role in the protection of the aircraft. Once the aircraft has come to a complete stop and engines are shut down, the crew shall ensure that access to the aircraft is controlled.

Aircraft-Specific Vulnerabilities

The Boeing 747-400 Freighter presents specific vulnerabilities due to its configuration. The main deck cargo door represents a high-risk access point during ground operations. The upper deck cockpit provides direct access to the flight deck, making control of stairs essential. Access

to the electronics and equipment bay exposes critical aircraft systems and requires heightened awareness.

Pay specific attention to the areas where persons could be disguised.

1.2.Aircraft sealing procedures

For long-term or overnight parking, the aircraft shall be sealed as a security measure to prevent unauthorized access. Aircraft sealing is used as an additional layer of protection when the aircraft is not under continuous monitoring and forms part of the overall access control concept.

When door sealing is applied as a method of aircraft protection, the seals used shall be tamper-evident, individually numbered, and subject to strict control. Prior to any subsequent access to the aircraft, all applied seals and corresponding serial numbers shall be inspected for integrity.

This is a sample of seal.
It's NOT damaged. It's individually numbered.

Prior to any subsequent access to the aircraft, all applied seals and corresponding serial numbers shall be inspected for integrity. If any indication of tampering, damage, or mismatch of serial numbers is detected, the aircraft shall not be accepted for operation until a thorough aircraft security search has been completed before cargo loading or further access.

Broken seal?

Report it to OCC and to the Security Manager.

Seal Control and Management

Aircraft security seals are controlled by the Load Control Department. Seals are stored in a secured container and managed under controlled conditions. Upon receipt of seals at the out-base office, an inventory is conducted and recorded in the aircraft security seal log. All seal movements are traceable through serial number control.

The security seal log records total seal stock with serial numbers, issued seals linked to aircraft registration and date of issue, and confirmation of seal usage including station, date, and time. This ensures full accountability and traceability of each seal used.

Application of Aircraft Seals

Aircraft sealing is performed by the Loadmaster or Ground Engineer before leaving the aircraft. Prior to applying a seal, the surface of the door and door frame shall be cleaned and dried to ensure proper adhesion. Each seal shall be placed partially on the door and partially on the door

frame, in a position that makes any unauthorised opening immediately evident. The seal serial number must remain clearly readable.

Once all required seals have been applied, the Loadmaster or Engineer shall take clear photographic evidence of each sealed door. These images are transmitted to the Load Control Department, and all seal serial numbers are recorded in the Loadmaster Report through the Centrik system. After sealing is completed, all access equipment shall be removed from the equipment restraint area.

Sealing Points – Boeing 747-400

For the Boeing 747-400 Freighter, aircraft sealing is applied to closed doors and access panels identified as security-sensitive. These include:

1. L1 DOOR
2. MAIN DECK SIDE CARGO DOOR (from inside)
3. AVIONIC DOOR
4. CENTRE ELECTRONICS ACCESS DOOR
5. LD FWD DOOR
6. LD AFT DOOR
7. BULK COMPARTMENT (from inside or outside)
8. UPPER DECK ACCESS DOOR
9. AVIONICS BAY ACCESS DOOR IN THE MAIN DECK FLOOR

Flight crew shall be aware that these sealing points are part of the aircraft's security baseline during long-term parking and that any irregularity affecting them must be treated as a security issue.

Flight Crew Awareness and Authority

No person is permitted to break an aircraft security seal or enter the aircraft without the permission of THE AIRLINE crew. Flight crew shall verify seal integrity during pre-flight or return-to-aircraft checks when sealing has been applied. Any discrepancy, missing seal, or sign of tampering shall be reported immediately, and the aircraft shall not be operated until security status is confirmed.

Aircraft sealing is not an administrative formality; it is a primary security control intended to protect the aircraft, cargo, and crew from unlawful interference.

1.3.Airport Identification Badge System

All international airports operate an airport identification badge system designed to control access to the restricted areas and aircraft. These systems form a fundamental layer of aviation security and are implemented in accordance with national civil aviation security programs and international standards.

Airport identification badges indicate the holder's authorization to access specific areas of the airport. Badges vary in appearance, color coding, symbols, or electronic access rights depending on the airport and the category of personnel.

⚠ Possession of an airport badge does not automatically grant permission to access the aircraft.

Crew Awareness

On cargo operations, personnel with valid airport badges may include ground handling personnel, such as cleaning personnel, security staff, and catering or technical contractors.

However, access to the cockpit—remains restricted and controlled.

Uniforms, high-visibility vests, tools, or vehicles *do not replace* the requirement for a valid airport identification badge. A badge must always be displayed and visible.

The responsibility of THE AIRLINE operating crew is to challenge anyone trying to enter the aircraft, check his/her badge and ensure the person has a valid reason to enter the aircraft.

These are the zones, where I am authorized to work (on the backside, the zones are described).

Compare the photo with the person's face

Ensure the ID is valid

1.4. Understanding when and how to verify a person's identity, and when access must be challenged or reported

During ground operations, you will encounter multiple persons approaching or entering the aircraft. Most of them are authorized and performing legitimate tasks. However, unauthorized access to a cargo aircraft rarely starts with force—it starts with assumption and silence**.** Your role is not to police the ramp, but to break the chain of opportunity when something does not look right.

When You Should Challenge or Verify

You should challenge or request verification whenever a person:

- Attempts to access the aircraft;
- Enters the aircraft without being clearly associated with an ongoing task;
- Cannot immediately explain **who they are and what they are doing.**

If you are thinking *"He probably belongs here"*, that is usually the moment when a challenge is required.

What "Challenging" Means in Practice

Challenging does not mean confrontation. It means stopping the access and clarifying:

- Who the person is;
- What task they are performing.

If the explanation is unclear, inconsistent, or rushed, access should not continue.

When to Stop and Report

You must stop the interaction and report the situation when:

a) Identification is not visible or cannot be produced;
b) The person becomes defensive or evasive;
c) Access is requested to the aircraft without clear justification;
d) Someone attempts to bypass normal access routes or procedures;
e) A seal, lock, or closed-door status is questioned or compromised;

At that point, the issue is no longer operational—it is **security-related**.

Reporting Is the Correct Action, Not an Escalation

Reporting does not mean accusing someone of wrongdoing. It means transferring the situation to those responsible for verification. Once reported, the matter becomes traceable and controlled.

You are expected to report **doubt**, not just confirmed threats.

2. Lesson 2 – Aircraft security search

Objective

This lesson provides flight crew with a high-level understanding of aircraft security searches: what they are, when they are required, who is responsible, and why they matter in cargo operations.

***Note**: Detailed search techniques, checklists, and hands-on procedures are covered in a separate dedicated module.*

What an Aircraft Security Search Is

An aircraft security search is a systematic inspection of accessible areas of the aircraft to confirm that:

a) no unauthorised person has accessed the aircraft,
b) no prohibited articles have been introduced, and
c) no suspicious items or indications of unlawful interference are present.

In cargo operations, a security search is a preventive control, not a response to a confirmed threat.

Areas Subject to Aircraft Security Search

An aircraft security search covers all areas of the aircraft to which persons have, or may have had, access. This includes the flight deck, upper deck areas, cargo compartments, technical and equipment bays, lavatories, galleys, and accessible exterior areas. The purpose is to ensure that no unauthorised person or prohibited article is present on board prior to departure.

For cargo aircraft such as the Boeing 747-400, particular attention is given to large cargo spaces, concealed structural areas, and access points to critical aircraft systems.

Use of the Aircraft Security Search Checklist

Aircraft security searches are conducted using an approved aircraft security search checklist. This checklist is documented in the Aviation Security Program. The checklist serves as a control tool to ensure that all required areas are examined and that the search is completed in a systematic and traceable manner.

At overview level, the operating crew members are expected to understand that the checklist:

- defines the scope of the search,
- assigns responsibility by area,
- and provides formal confirmation that the search has been completed.

The detailed content and practical use of the checklist are covered in the dedicated security search module.

Recording and Communication of Search Completion

When an aircraft security search is performed, its completion is recorded using the company's approved system. This record includes confirmation that the search has been completed and identifies the person responsible.

The Pilot-in-Command must receive confirmation that the search has been completed before departure. Clear communication between flight crew, loadmasters, and ground personnel is essential to ensure that no further access occurs after the search is completed.

Clean and Search Concept

In certain situations, aircraft security searches are preceded by cleaning or removal of waste materials. This ensures that search areas are unobstructed and that prohibited items cannot be concealed among operational debris.

Flight crew should understand that cleaning and searching are complementary activities and that a security search is effective only when all areas are accessible and visible.

Importance of Aircraft Configuration Knowledge

Effective aircraft security searches depend on a clear understanding of the aircraft's configuration. Different aircraft types present different access points, hidden spaces, and system locations.

For the Boeing 747-400, the size of the aircraft, the separation between decks, and the presence of multiple technical compartments increase the importance of type-specific knowledge. Awareness of aircraft configuration allows search personnel to focus on realistic concealment locations.

Practical Training and Search Standards

Aircraft security searches must be performed to a standard that reasonably ensures the detection of concealed prohibited articles. This standard cannot be achieved through theoretical knowledge alone.

Practical training on Boeing 747-400 aircraft type is therefore required. Such training familiarizes personnel with real aircraft layouts, access limitations, and typical concealment methods. The objective is consistency, thoroughness, and reliability in search performance.

Key Takeaway
An aircraft security search is effective only when it is structured, recorded, and adapted to the aircraft type.

Awareness comes first; proficiency is developed through dedicated practical training.

3. Lesson 3 – In-flight aviation security measures

Module Learning Objectives

The objective of this module is to ensure that pilots, loadmasters, and ground engineers understand how to maintain in-flight aviation security on cargo-only operations by controlling access to the flight deck, applying disciplined communication, recognizing and managing disruptive behavior, and correctly reporting security-related events.

3.1. Cockpit Doors

General Rule – Applicable to All Cargo Flights

On the Boeing 747-400 Freighter, there is no reinforced cockpit door separating the flight deck from a passenger cabin, as the aircraft is configured for cargo-only operations.

This does NOT mean that access to the flight deck is unrestricted.

During all phases of flight, access to the flight deck shall be strictly controlled**.** Only persons whose presence is essential for operational necessity or flight safety shall be permitted access to the flight deck.

Although cargo aircraft do not have a reinforced cockpit door separating passengers and/or other personnel from the flight deck, flight deck access control remains a critical in-flight security measure**.**

Unauthorized access to the flight deck constitutes a serious security breach**.**

3.2. Access to the Flight Deck – Authorized Persons Only

On cargo-only operations, access to the flight deck may be required by:

- Loadmasters;
- Technical personnel;
- Authorized company or regulatory personnel (when approved).

Access shall only be granted with the knowledge and approval of the Pilot-in-Command (PIC)**.**

Prohibited Access

Under no circumstances these persons shall be allowed in the cockpit:

- Unauthorized persons;

- Persons without operational necessity.

ACCESS TO THE FLIGHT DECK REMAINS CONTROLLED AND GRANTED FOR THOUSE WITH AN OPERATIONAL NEED, WITH COMMANDER APPROVAL.

3.3. Flight Deck Communication Procedures

General Rule

Clear, concise, and unambiguous communication between crew members is essential for maintaining in-flight security**.**

All crew members shall:

- Immediately communicate any security concern to the PIC;
- Use standard phraseology;
- Avoid ambiguous or delayed reporting of security-related observations.

Security-related communication may involve:

- Suspicious behavior of authorized persons on board;
- Signs of tampering or interference;
- Threat information received during flight.

Communication Before Entering the Flight Deck

Before entering the flight deck during flight, any authorized person shall first request permission from the Pilot-in-Command**.**

The request shall:

1. Be made verbally;
2. Clearly identify the person;
3. Clearly state the reason for entry;
4. Await explicit approval from the PIC.

Standard phrasing to be used:

"Captain, may I come in? I need to [state the operational reason]."

Entry shall only occur **after the PIC grants permission**.

Silently entering the flight deck, entering without approval, or assuming consent is considered a breach of flight deck access control.

3.4. In-Flight Security Officers (IFSOs)

In-Flight Security Officers (IFSOs) are state-designated, specially trained security personnel deployed on board aircraft for the purpose of protecting the aircraft, crew, and occupants against acts of unlawful interference during flight.

IFSOs operate under the authority of a State, not the airline, and their deployment is a national security decision. IFSOs are not a routine security measure and are only used when a specific threat assessment justifies their presence.

Applicability

THE AIRLINE operates cargo-only aircraft and does not deploy In-Flight Security Officers**.** Therefore, procedures related to IFSOs **are not applicable** to PXA operations.

3.5. Notification and Communication Regarding Armed Persons on Board

General Legal Principle

The carriage of weapons on board an aircraft is a highly restricted activity and is permitted only under specific conditions defined by national law and State security authorities. In the Republic of Moldova, the authorized carriage of weapons on board aircraft is regulated by Law No. 192/2019.

Cases Where Carriage of Weapons Is Permitted (In Theory)

According to Law No. 192/2019 of the Republic of Moldova, the carriage of weapons in the passenger cabin of an aircraft may be permitted only in the following cases:

1. Authorized personnel providing security for persons entitled to State protection (this may include bodyguards or protection officers assigned to high-ranking officials or persons under State protection);
2. Authorized personnel escorting diplomatic shipments;
3. Authorized personnel escorting persons under arrest (in custody);
4. In-Flight Security Officers (IFSOs).

Differences Between States

It is important for crew to understand that:

- Carriage of weapons on board aircraft is regulated differently by each State;
- What is permitted under Moldovan law may be prohibited, restricted, or subject to different conditions in other States.

Crew members shall **never assume** that authorization in one State applies in another.

Applicability to THE AIRLINE Operations

THE AIRLINE operates cargo-only aircraft and does not carry passengers. As a result, the carriage of weapons in a passenger cabin is not applicable.

THE AIRLINE does not conduct operations involving:

- Bodyguards;
- Persons under arrest;
- IFSOs on board.

This information is provided for awareness only, to ensure crew understanding of the legal framework and to prevent incorrect assumptions.

3.6. Handling of Unruly or Potentially Disruptive Persons

Potentially disruptive passenger	Unruly passenger
- a passenger who is either a deportee, a person deemed inadmissible by the competent authorities, or a person in lawful custody.	- someone who fails to respect rules or follow crew/staff instructions, disturbing good order and discipline on an aircraft or at an airport, thereby jeopardizing safety, people, or property.

Cargo-Only Interpretation
On cargo flights, disruptive behavior may involve:

a) Pilots;
b) Loadmasters;
c) Ground engineers;
d) Authorized non-crew persons.

General Rule

Any behaviour that threatens flight safety, disrupts crew coordination or undermines authority of the PIC shall be addressed immediately.

The PIC shall:

1. Take necessary actions to maintain control and safety;
2. Apply de-escalation measures where possible;
3. Decide on continuation or diversion of the flight if required.

3.7. Reporting Procedures

Mandatory Reporting

All security-related events occurring in flight shall be:

- Communicated to OCC as soon as practicable;
- Reported after landing via Centrik.

Reportable events include:

- Unauthorized access attempts
- Suspicious behaviour
- Security-related threats or information
- Breach of access control.

When a report is submitted as **Not confidential**, the identity of the reporting person is visible. A defined group of high-ranking managers can see who submitted the report and what was reported.

When a report is submitted as **Confidential**, the identity of the reporting person is visible only to the Security Manager. No other manager can see who submitted the report. The Security Manager handles the report discreetly and protects the identity of the reporter.

When a report is submitted as Anonymous, the reporting software does not store any information about who submitted the report. It is not possible to identify the reporting person. This option exists to ensure that even sensitive concerns can be reported without fear. Because follow-up may not be possible, the report should be written clearly and completely.

4. Lesson 4 – Transportation of unruly passengers

Module Learning Objectives

The objective of this module is to ensure the crew members are aware of the basics regarding transportation of the unruly passengers.

For the Airline, this module has not been detailed as the airline doesn't transport passengers.

Procedures for the handling of unruly passengers

National aviation security legislation establishes specific rules and mandatory procedures for the transportation of unruly or potentially disruptive passengers. These rules define when such persons may be transported, the required notifications, the content of those notifications, and the roles and responsibilities of the crew.

Such legislation typically requires:

- Notification of the airline by the competent authority;
- Notification of the Pilot-in-Command and crew;
- Clear definition of crew responsibilities;
- Application of additional security measures.

THE AIRLINE operates cargo-only aircraft and does not transport passengers. As a result, all procedures related to the transport, handling, or management of unruly or potentially disruptive passengers are not applicable to THE AIRLINE operations.

What is important for THE AIRLINE Crew?

Although passenger-related procedures are not applicable, one fundamental principle remains fully applicable**:**

The Pilot-in-Command has final authority over the aircraft and all persons on board.

If, for any reason, a crew member or authorized person on board a cargo aircraft becomes unruly, disruptive, or presents a threat to flight safety or security, the Pilot-in-Command has the authority to:

- Take immediate action to protect the safety of the flight;
- Remove (offload) that person before departure;
- Refuse carriage if the person's behaviour represents a security or safety risk.

This authority exists independently of rank, position, or function and shall be exercised whenever necessary in the interest of flight safety and security.

5. Lesson 5 – Potential acts of sabotage. Crisis management procedures

Module Learning Objectives

The objective of this module is to ensure that crew members can recognize potential acts of sabotage and understand their impact on flight safety and security. Upon completion, crew shall be able to apply crisis management procedures, maintain aircraft control, and support the Pilot-in-Command during security-related emergencies.

5.1. Procedures in case of emergency situations

General Principle

In any emergency situation, the protection of flight safety and aircraft security has priority. The Pilot-in-Command (PIC) has final authority over the aircraft, crew, and all actions taken during an emergency.

All crew members shall comply immediately with PIC instructions.

Identification of an Emergency Situation

An emergency situation may include, but is not limited to:

- Bomb threat or suspected explosive device;
- Unlawful interference or attempted unlawful interference (hijack);
- Security-related threat received in flight or on ground;
- Aggressive, unruly, or incapacitated crew member.

BOMB THREAT ON GROUND / IN-FLIGHT

HIJACKING

Procedures in Case of a Bomb Threat
(THE AIRLINE – Cargo-Only Operations)

General Principle
Any bomb threat shall be treated as credible until proven otherwise. The Pilot-in-Command has final authority over all decisions related to the handling of a bomb threat. All actions shall be coordinated with Air Traffic Control, the operator, and relevant authorities, and shall follow approved company procedures as described in the Aviation Security Program, Chapter 9.

Bomb Threat Associated with an Aircraft on the Ground
When a bomb threat or warning is associated with an aircraft that is still on the ground, and once the information has been assessed in coordination with the operator and airport authorities, the primary objective is to remove people from risk, isolate the aircraft, and allow safe search**.**

All persons on board shall disembark in a controlled manner using stairs or passenger jetties where available. Emergency slides shall only be used in extreme situations where immediate danger exists, as their use introduces additional risk and injury potential.

The aircraft will be moved to an isolated or remote parking position, where available, to minimize risk to other aircraft, infrastructure, and personnel. Isolation allows security forces and emergency services to operate safely and reduces potential collateral damage.

All persons and their belongings who disembarked shall be isolated and re-screened in accordance with airport and State procedures. Although THE AIRLINE does not carry passengers, this principle remains applicable to crew and authorized personnel to ensure that no prohibited items are reintroduced.

All cargo shall be unloaded. Cargo must be screened or searched in accordance with approved procedures before any consideration of re-loading. Catering supplies, if applicable, shall be unloaded and their integrity verified and screened.

The aircraft shall be subjected to a full security search in accordance with company procedures. No attempt shall be made to return the aircraft to service until it has been declared safe by the competent authority.



Bomb Threat Received in Flight

When a bomb threat is received in flight, the situation requires calm, disciplined decision-making. The Pilot-in-Command shall immediately assess the operational environment, including terrain and airspace constraints. Before initiating a descent, it is essential to verify that the terrain allows safe descent by checking current MOCA, MORA, or MSA, and applying corrections for pressure, temperature, and wind. This is critical to avoid controlled flight into terrain while responding to the threat.

If descent is required, it should be achieved as efficiently as possible. Reaching a lower altitude reduces pressure differential and limits the potential effects of an explosion on the aircraft structure. At the same time, unnecessary aggressive manoeuvres shall be avoided.

When selecting a suitable airport for landing, the Pilot-in-Command shall consider aircraft performance and the suitability of the airport. The aircraft should be flown as close to standard procedures as the situation permits, as predictability supports safety and coordination.

The Pilot-in-Command shall consider aircraft speed. Higher speed may reduce exposure time, while lower speed may reduce aerodynamic forces if an explosion occurs. In most cases, the recommended turbulence penetration speed provides an appropriate balance between these considerations.

The crew shall be prepared for the possible use of oxygen masks or smoke hoods. Air Traffic Control shall be kept informed of intentions so that emergency services, police, and airport authorities can be alerted and prepared. The operator shall also be informed as soon as practicable, and assistance requested as required.

When assessing routing, the Pilot-in-Command should consider the consequences of a potential explosion over densely populated areas. If possible, flight over such areas should be minimized. If immediate landing is not possible, expert advice may be sought via Air Traffic Services. Any advice received shall be evaluated by the Pilot-in-Command, who retains final authority.

When contacting Air Traffic Control prior to landing, a remote parking position shall be requested. Ground handling requirements, including the need for stairs, shall be communicated. After landing and evacuation, persons shall be moved to a safe distance from the aircraft, normally at least 100 meters, unless otherwise directed by authorities.

Actions Guided by the Pilot-in-Command

Where information exists indicating an actual or perceived security threat, the Pilot-in-Command shall immediately communicate this information to the responsible Air Traffic Control unit. An emergency shall be declared, stating the nature of the threat. The aircraft shall be diverted to the nearest suitable airfield where a safe landing can be made, whether civil or military.

If appropriate and safe to do so, the Pilot-in-Command may instruct crew members to carry out an in-flight search in accordance with approved procedures, using the designated forms or checklists. Such inspections shall never compromise flight safety.

If the aircraft is not over a densely populated area, it should be routed toward the nearest suitable airfield while avoiding populated areas as far as practicable. If the approach path to a suitable airport requires flight over a densely populated area, the aircraft may proceed to land in accordance with established emergency procedures.

Discovery of a Suspicious Item on Board

If a suspicious item is discovered on board, it shall not be moved, touched, or opened unless specifically required by approved procedures. The objective is to minimize disturbance and prevent accidental initiation.

DO NOT MOVE **DO NOT TOUCH** **DO NOT OPEN**

Non-essential persons shall be positioned as far away as possible from the item. Crew members shall be instructed to remain low, keeping heads below the level of seat backs or structure where applicable, in order to reduce exposure to blast or fragments.

Portable oxygen equipment and first aid kits shall be removed from the immediate vicinity to prevent secondary hazards. Fire extinguishers shall be made readily available.

If an immediate landing can be made, the item shall remain in place. It may be covered with polythene to keep it dry and then surrounded with soft, blast-absorbing materials such as pillows, blankets, or clothing. The item itself must remain dry, while surrounding materials may be wetted to reduce the risk of fire. These actions shall only be taken if explicitly permitted by company procedures and if they do not increase risk.

Reporting

All bomb threats, whether assessed as real or false, shall be reported to the operator as soon as practicable and documented through the company reporting system after completion of the

event. Accurate reporting is essential for regulatory compliance, threat assessment, and continuous improvement.

Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijack) – Cargo-Only Operations
Legal and Command Framework

Under the Tokyo Convention, the Pilot-in-Command has full authority over the aircraft, cargo, and all persons on board during flight. This authority extends to all crew members and to any personnel present onboard. In the event of unlawful interference, the Pilot-in-Command remains in command at all times.

During a hijack, all crew actions shall support the authority of the Pilot-in-Command and the safe operation of the aircraft. Communications shall follow emergency procedures and be coordinated through the Pilot-in-Command.

The preferred outcome in all hijack situations is to land the aircraft as soon as safely possible.

Overriding Policy During a Hijack

1) ***The primary priority*** is the preservation of life. This is achieved by avoiding confrontation and preventing escalation.
2) ***Crew shall comply*** with hijacker demands insofar as those demands do not compromise immediate flight safety. Compliance does not mean surrender. Calm dialogue may allow time, reduce stress, and in some cases influence the hijacker to modify demands.
3) ***Crew shall be guided by instructions from authorities.*** Authorities have access to intelligence and situational awareness beyond what is available to the crew inside the aircraft. Where possible and safe, their instructions should be followed.
4) ***Ground authorities must be kept fully informed.*** Crew observation is critical. Objective, factual information is essential for authorities to manage the situation.
5) ***Independent action is prohibited.*** Crew shall not attempt heroics or improvisation. Any action beyond compliance and communication shall only be taken in extreme circumstances and only with the explicit agreement of the Pilot-in-Command.

Crew Objective During a Hijack

The objective is the safe release of the crew and protection of the aircraft. Crew shall remain calm and focus on safe aircraft operation. Emotional reactions, arguments, or visible resistance increase risk and must be avoided.

If able, the crew shall inform Air Traffic Control that a hijack has occurred and provide factual information such as the number of hijackers, observed weapons, and behaviour. Information should be passed discreetly and without alerting hijackers where possible.

Force shall not be used unless there is an imminent and unavoidable threat to life. Physical resistance is a last resort. Crew shall comply with hijacker instructions as long as those instructions do not directly endanger the aircraft. For example, a demand that would cause loss of control of the aircraft must not be followed.

Instructions from Air Traffic Control may be accepted when they do not increase risk. The Pilot-in-Command shall assess each instruction. Crew should demonstrate that all flight crew members are essential to safe operation. This discourages attempts to isolate or remove key crew members.

Conversation with hijackers should be practical and safety-focused. Crew may show understanding or empathy but must never support or justify the hijacker's actions. Political, moral, or ideological discussions must be avoided, as they increase hostility and risk retaliation. Where possible, one crew member should be identified as the main communicator with the hijackers. This reduces confusion and helps establish a controlled rapport.

Crew should encourage hijackers to communicate directly with ground authorities rather than through the crew. Fixed landline communication should be promoted whenever available. Crew shall discreetly observe and remember details about the hijacker(s), such as behaviour, language, appearance, and weapons, and pass this information to authorities when safe to do so.

Operational limitations such as fuel requirements, crew fatigue, or technical constraints may be used to slow the situation and gain time, but never as deception that could provoke anger if discovered.

What shall be done in case if hijacker attempts to take control over the aircraft?

1. Maintain aircraft command and control at all costs.
2. Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew.
3. Defend flight crew compartment using whatever force is necessary to eliminate the threat.
4. Use commands and all available resources necessary to subdue assailant(s) and eliminate the threat.
5. Use restraints and other on-board resources.
6. Pilot-in-command will declare an emergency and activate landing plan for nearest suitable airport.
7. Squawk appropriate transponder code.
8. Monitor radio on 121.5 MHz and prepare for interception by military aircraft.

9. As soon as operationally feasible initiate possible rapid descent.
10. After landing, if possible, pull fire switches and disconnect generators.

Squawk Code 7500: Hijacked Aircraft

Squawk Code 7700:
Aircraft in an Emergency State

6. Lesson 6 – In-flight supplies

Module Learning Objectives

The purpose of this lesson is to ensure that flight crew, loadmasters, and ground engineers understand the security requirements related to in-flight supplies on cargo aircraft, with particular focus on COMAIL, COMAT, and aircraft cleaning products. In-flight supplies represent a potential avenue for sabotage if not properly controlled.

6.1. Acceptance of COMAIL and COMAT

COMAIL refers to **company mail**, meaning mail or correspondence belonging to the aircraft operator or its contracted service providers, intended for operational or company use.

For THE AIRLINE operations, COMAIL shall be treated as **mail from a security perspective**. This means that COMAIL must be subject to security controls equivalent to those applied to cargo or mail.

COMAT refers to company material, meaning equipment, parts, tools, documents, or supplies belonging to the operator and required for aircraft operation or maintenance.

Only COMAIL and COMAT that has been:

- screened using an approved method, and
- protected from interference after screening

may be accepted for loading on board the aircraft.

Crew shall pay particular attention to abnormalities, including COMAIL / COMAT originating from unknown companies or persons, or COMAIL / COMAT that is not accompanied by appropriate documentation. Any COMAIL / COMAT without documentation, or with unclear origin, shall not be accepted.

6.2. Acceptance of Aircraft Cleaning Products

Products used for aircraft cleaning or servicing are also considered in-flight supplies and may present a security risk if introduced without control.

When accepting any in-flight supplies, including cleaning products, the crew member accepting the supplies shall:

- verify the identity of the person entering the aircraft;
- ensure that the person is authorized and properly identified;
- verify accompanying documentation;
- observe the behaviour of the person delivering the supplies.

Suspicious behaviour such as nervousness, evasive answers, unusual urgency, or inconsistent explanations shall not be ignored. Crew shall not assume that such behaviour is insignificant. Any concern shall be escalated in accordance with company procedures.

Supplies shall never be accepted from unknown persons or companies, even if the items appear harmless or routine.

Behavioral Awareness and Escalation

Crew shall remain vigilant during acceptance of all in-flight supplies. Security threats often exploit routine activities. If anything appears unusual, inconsistent, or unclear, the correct action is to:

- stop the acceptance process;
- deny access to the aircraft;
- inform the Pilot-in-Command and/or OCC as required.

There is no penalty for delaying operations for security reasons. There is a serious risk in accepting supplies without proper verification.

Additional Practical Points

Crew should be aware of **last-minute changes**. Unexpected replacement of suppliers, sudden changes in delivery personnel, or urgent requests to "just put something on board" are common indicators of security weakness.

Crew should ensure that **packages are consistent** with their description. If documentation says "documents" and the package is unusually heavy or bulky, this shall be questioned.

Crew should remember that protection after screening is equally important. If screened COMAIL or COMAT has been left unattended or its integrity is in doubt, it shall be treated as unscreened.

7. Lesson 7 – Knowledge and definition of critical civil aviation information systems

Module Learning Objectives

The purpose of this lesson is to give crew members a practical understanding of key aviation security systems used at airports and within aviation operations, and to explain how failures, misuse, or abnormal behavior related to these systems can create security risks.

Crew are not expected to operate these systems, but they must understand their function, limitations, and when to escalate concerns.

7.1 Access Control Systems

Access control systems are used to restrict and monitor access to security-restricted areas such as airside zones, aircraft parking areas, and technical facilities. These systems typically rely on airport identification cards, biometric readers, codes, or a combination of methods.

For THE AIRLINE crew, access control systems are critical because they define who is allowed to enter the Security Restricted Area**.** Crew shall be alert to situations where access control appears weak or bypassed, such as doors propped open, tailgating, badges not being checked, or persons gaining access without challenge.

Their purpose is to ensure that only authorized persons and vehicles can enter sensitive areas, to prevent unauthorized access to the aircraft, and to allow identification, deterrence, and investigation of security breaches.

If access control measures are observed to be ineffective or deliberately bypassed, this shall be treated as a security concern and reported.

7.2 Departure Control Systems (DCS)

Departure Control Systems are centralized IT systems used at airports to manage the departure process of aircraft.

What a DCS is used for:

- managing passenger check-in and boarding data;
- generating and controlling passenger and flight movement information;
- supporting coordination between airlines, airports, and security authorities;
- providing operational data used for security checks and movement control;
- generating the loadsheets and other flight documentation.

Purpose of the system:

- to ensure that only properly processed and authorized persons are associated with a flight;
- to support aviation security by linking operational data with security screening processes;
- to provide accurate and traceable information to airport authorities and other systems.

Even though THE AIRLINE does not carry passengers, understanding the purpose of DCS helps crew understand how airport security relies on interconnected systems and verified data.

7.3 Passenger and Baggage Matching Systems

Passenger and baggage matching systems are security systems used to ensure that checked baggage is only loaded onto an aircraft when the associated passenger is confirmed to be on board.

Purpose of the system:

- to prevent the carriage of unaccompanied items;
- to reduce the risk of prohibited or dangerous items being placed on board;
- to maintain accountability between persons and items transported.

Although these systems are not applicable to cargo-only operations, the security principle behind them remains fully relevant. For THE AIRLINE, this principle is applied through strict control of cargo, COMAIL, COMAT, and in-flight supplies.

Any item loaded without proper documentation, authorization, and security screening shall be considered a potential security risk and must not be accepted.

7.4 Hold Baggage Security Control Systems

Hold baggage security control systems are security screening systems, such as X-ray and explosives detection systems, used to examine checked baggage before it is loaded onto an aircraft.

Purpose of the system:

- to detect prohibited items, explosives, or other dangerous articles;
- to prevent dangerous items from being introduced into the aircraft hold;
- to ensure that baggage loaded on board has been subject to an approved security control.

In cargo operations, the same security concept applies through **cargo and mail screening systems**. Cargo, COMAIL, and COMAT accepted as "screened" rely not only on the screening method itself, but also on the integrity of the process after screening**.**

If screened cargo or COMAT is left unattended, substituted, accessed by unauthorized persons, or handled outside controlled procedures, the screening is no longer valid and the security system has effectively failed.

7.5 Airport and vehicle pass management and issuance systems

Airport and vehicle pass management and issuance systems are administrative and technical systems used to issue, control, monitor, and revoke identification passes for persons and permits for vehicles that require access to restricted areas of an airport.

These systems regulate access by defining:

- which persons are authorized to enter specific airport areas;
- which vehicles are permitted to operate in restricted zones;
- the scope, duration, and conditions of the access granted.

Identification passes are typically linked to an individual's role, operational necessity, background checks, and validity period. Vehicle permits function in a similar way and are issued only to approved vehicles that meet airport security requirements.

The purpose of these systems is to:

- prevent unauthorized access to airside and security-restricted areas;
- ensure accountability and traceability of persons and vehicles within the airport;
- support detection of misuse, expired authorization, or abnormal access patterns;
- enable effective investigation and response in case of security incidents.

By managing issuance, monitoring use, and withdrawing access when no longer justified, these systems form a core element of airport security architecture.

7.6 Security Equipment (Metal Detectors, X-ray, EDS)

WTMD – Walk-Through Metal Detector	
	A Walk-Through Metal Detector is a fixed security screening device through which a person walks to detect the presence of metal objects on their body. **Purpose and detection:** ➢ to screen persons for concealed metallic items; ➢ to detect firearms, knives, tools, and other metal weapons; ➢ to provide an initial security check before access to restricted areas.

ETD – Explosive Trace Detection	
	Explosive Trace Detection equipment is a security device used to analyze samples collected from persons or objects for microscopic traces of explosives. **Purpose and detection:** ➢ to detect trace amounts of explosive substances; ➢ to screen hands, clothing, bags, or surfaces; ➢ to identify contact with or handling of explosive materials.

Security Scanners (Body Scanners)

	Security scanners, also known as body scanners, are advanced imaging systems used to detect objects concealed under clothing. **Purpose and detection:** ➢ to detect metallic and non-metallic items; ➢ to identify concealed weapons, explosives, or prohibited articles; ➢ to enhance detection capability beyond metal-based screening.

HHMD – Hand-Held Metal Detector	
	A Hand-Held Metal Detector is a portable security screening device operated manually by security personnel. **Purpose and detection:** ➢ to locate metallic objects on a person; ➢ to pinpoint the position of detected metal items; ➢ to support secondary screening following an alarm.

SMD – Shoe Metal Detector	
	A Shoe Metal Detector is a specialized screening device used to inspect footwear for concealed metallic items. **Purpose and detection:** • to detect metal items hidden in shoes; • to identify weapons or components concealed in footwear; • to address vulnerabilities not covered by standard screening.

X-RAY



X-ray equipment is security screening technology used to examine the contents of items without opening them.

Its purpose is to identify prohibited or dangerous items, detect weapons, explosives, and other suspicious objects, and allow visual assessment of the contents of baggage, cargo, or supplies.

7.7. Air Traffic Management Systems and Access to Them

Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems are integrated technical and procedural systems used to manage, coordinate, and control aircraft movements in the air and on the ground. These systems support the safe, orderly, and efficient flow of air traffic and are a critical element of aviation safety and security.

ATM systems include surveillance, communication, navigation, flight data processing, and decision-support systems used by Air Traffic Control (ATC) units. Through these systems, controllers monitor aircraft position, altitude, speed, route, and intentions, and issue instructions to maintain separation and manage traffic flow.

The primary purpose of air traffic management systems is to ensure flight safety by preventing collisions, managing airspace capacity, and supporting timely responses to abnormal or emergency situations. From a security perspective, ATM systems also play a key role in detecting and managing unlawful interference, loss of communication, deviation from cleared routes, or suspicious aircraft behaviour.

Access to air traffic management systems is strictly controlled. Only authorized and trained personnel are permitted to use or interact with these systems, and access is limited according to operational role and responsibility. This restriction exists because unauthorized access,

manipulation, or interference with ATM systems could have serious or catastrophic consequences.

From a security standpoint, interference with ATM systems may result in false information being displayed, loss of situational awareness, incorrect instructions, or delayed emergency response. For this reason, ATM systems are protected through technical safeguards, access controls, monitoring, and oversight by competent authorities.

In summary, air traffic management systems are a core element of aviation safety and security. While crew do not operate these systems, understanding their purpose, importance, and sensitivity reinforces the need for accurate communication, compliance with procedures, and vigilance against any abnormal or suspicious situations involving air traffic services.

---------- End of the Module 9 ----------

Module 10 – Aircraft Security Search

1. Lesson 1 - Ability to conduct aircraft security search to a standard sufficient to reasonably ensure the detection of concealed prohibited articles

Module Learning Objectives

The purpose of this module is to provide the personnel with standardized knowledge and practical guidance for the effective conduct of aircraft security searches on Boeing 747-400 aircraft, in order to detect prohibited items, weapons, explosive devices, or other articles that may pose a threat to the safety of the aircraft, crew, cargo, and ground personnel.

1.1. Cases in which an aircraft security search shall be conducted

The aircraft must be subject to an aircraft security search in the following cases:

1. Before every departure;
2. At any time, there is reason to believe that the security of the aircraft may have been compromised, including but not limited to:
    - Unauthorised access to the aircraft;
    - The aircraft left unattended or without adequate security protection.

1.2. Methods of conducting a security screening

How to perform an aircraft security search?

The following methods of examination of areas, either individually or in combination, shall be applied:

1. Hand search – primary method;
2. Visual check, for the examination of areas that are empty.

A search should be conducted in good lighting conditions and using flashlights and mirrors when searching in confined or dark areas. It may not be necessary to search some areas if a door, compartment or piece of equipment is properly sealed or secured and there is no evidence of tampering.

On completion of a search, a final inspection is made by crew member to ensure that all doors and covers have been properly secured. The aircraft's sterile condition must be maintained until its departure.

1.3. Information on the security screening

The following information on the aircraft security search of a departing flight should be recorded and kept at a point not on the aircraft for the duration of the flight or for 24 hours, whichever is longer:

a) flight number; and
b) origin of the previous flight; and

Where an aircraft security search was performed, the information should also include:

c) date and time that the aircraft security search was completed; and
d) the name and signature of the person responsible for the performance of the aircraft security search.

1.4. Knowledge of the configuration of aircraft types

The Boeing 747-400, is a long-range, wide-body, four-engine aircraft designed for intercontinental operations. The aircraft features a distinctive upper deck and a two-aisle main deck cabin, allowing high cargo capacity and efficient long-haul performance.

1. Flight Deck

- Located on the upper forward section of the aircraft;
- Equipped with modern avionics, flight management systems, and navigation equipment;
- Access is controlled and limited.

2. Main Deck Cargo Compartment

The former passenger cabin has been fully converted into a main deck cargo compartment**.** It is **e**quipped with:

- Cargo loading system (rollers, locks, and guides);
- Tie-down points for palletized and containerized cargo.

The compartment is classified as a Class E cargo compartment, in accordance with applicable certification standards

3. Lower Deck Cargo Compartments

- Forward and aft lower deck cargo holds;
- Used for cargo, mail, and operational equipment;
- Equipped with fire detection and suppression systems;
- Accessible via external lower deck cargo doors.

Security-Sensitive Areas

The following areas are considered **security-sensitive** and are subject to aircraft security search procedures:

- Flight deck;
- Main deck cargo compartment;
- Lower deck cargo compartments;
- Avionics bays;
- Access panels, voids, and structural compartments.

1.5. List of areas to be screened

Boeing 747-400 – All-Cargo Configuration

Responsibilities & Areas of Security Search

Pilot-in-Command

The Pilot-in-Command has overall responsibility for ensuring the security search of the aircraft is carried out fully and diligently by qualified personnel prior to every departure. The Pilot-in-Command receives verbal confirmation from the responsible persons that the security search has been completed and ensures the **'Aircraft Security Search' checklist** is completed to document the aircraft security search has been performed.

A copy of the Aircraft Security Search Checklist is transmitted to the ground staff before departure. An aircraft security search includes the examination of the following accessible areas of the aircraft interior.

Flight Crew

A member of the flight crew is responsible for the security search of the aircraft flight crew compartment. The security search includes the following areas:

a) Seats;
b) Between the seats and between the seat and the wall;
c) Behind seats;
d) Seat pockets (if applicable);
e) Entire floor including area forward of the rudder pedals and beneath all seats;
f) Ceiling, side and rear wall;
g) Pedestal and consoles;
h) Windshield;
i) All instrument and switch panels;
j) All circuit breaker fuse panels;
k) Coat locker;
l) Ash trays;
m) Flight library stowage;
n) Life jacket stowage;
o) Spare lamp stowage;
p) Crew oxygen masks stowage;
q) Emergency door and mechanism.
r) Special attention is given to life jacket packages and the areas under seat cushions.

The search of the life jacket package includes physically removing each life jacket package from the holder and visually checking for signs of tampering. Once the life jacket package is removed, the holder and area around it are visually checked.

Any life jacket package or holder that appears to have been tampered with is removed from the aircraft and replaced.

The Flight Engineer
The flight engineer is responsible for the security search of the aircraft interior, including the lavatory, galley, electrical and equipment compartments, and exterior of the aircraft.

Lavatory
The lavatory security search includes:

a) Remove soiled and waste materials if not previously removed;
b) Remove and inspect containers under the sink;
c) Inspect sink and area around sink;
d) Towel container;
e) Tissue dispenser;
f) Toilet seat and lid;
g) Mirror and compartment;
h) Ceiling, walls and floor;
i) Door.

Security search of the lavatory includes compartments and access panels within the lavatory and areas adjacent to or accessible from those access panels and compartments where prohibited items or contraband may be concealed.

If a lavatory compartment or access panel can be reasonably opened with a common tool (for example: a screwdriver), and it is not secured with a tamper-evident seal, the compartment or access panel is opened and searched.

Galley Complex
The galley security search includes:

a) Remove and inspect all drawer surfaces (inner and outer);
b) Open and inspect all panels/compartments;
c) All accessible buffet surfaces;
d) Waste container;
e) Ceiling, walls and floor.

Electrical and Equipment Compartments
The security search includes:

- Check shelves and all surfaces of equipment for foreign objects or materials;
- Check all areas, floor, walls and ceiling.

Fuselage
The fuselage security search includes:

- Nose gear wheel well, associated installed units, equipment and attachment points;
- Wheels, brakes, nose landing gear structure, communications panel housing;
- Aircraft service panels and service hatches if accessible without the use of tools, keys, stairs or other aids, without breaking seals, and where a prohibited article could reasonably be concealed:
  a. Avionics compartment access door;
  b. External power access panel;
  c. Lavatory service panel access door;
  d. Centre equipment bay access door;

- Avionics cooling exhaust;
- Cargo compartment door and surrounding areas;
- Air conditioning inlets;
- Main landing gear wheel wells, associated installed units, equipment and attachment points;
- Wheels, brakes, main landing gear structure.

At certain destinations THE AIRLINE aircraft may be deemed at higher risk from unauthorised persons gaining access to wheel wells and the undercarriage. Engineers shall, during the search at such airports, undertake a thorough visual search of the undercarriage bay areas before pushback to ensure that there are no unauthorised persons in the area.

The security search is carried out when all personnel and vehicles have left the aircraft side. It is not necessary to drop the undercarriage doors or to physically enter wheel bay areas to achieve this check. It is recommended that a mirror on a pole be used to view those areas of the wheel bay that cannot otherwise be viewed from the ramp.

Engines

The engine security search includes:

- Engine intake cowl;
- Engine exhaust cowl;
- Access to engine underside area;
- Oil servicing access panels;
- Generator access panels;
- Starter valve access panels.

Loadmaster

The Loadmaster is responsible for the security search of the upper and lower cargo compartments.

Main Deck Cargo Compartment

The security search includes:

- Loadmaster workplace and the adherent zone;
- The consoles for technical documentation;

- The floor and the cargo equipment;
- The ramp, in the visual check of the accessible places;
- The ceiling and the equipment placed on it, available for visual examination;
- Check cargo restraint nets and inspect all areas;
- Check removable divider nets;
- Check items contained within the hold.

Lower Deck Cargo Compartment
The security search includes:

- With containers removed, check all areas, floor, walls and ceiling;
- Unzip flexible panels and inspect areas inside;
- Check opening under catwalk platforms.

1.6.Recording of screening performance/communication with the pilot-in-command

Records Management
Completion of the Aircraft Security Search Checklist is mandatory after the aircraft security search. It is completed in 2 copies.

THE AIRLINE has developed an aircraft search procedure checklist the aircraft in service. The checklist is part of the flight security documents. Use of the checklist is helpful as it provides details of the specific locations that must be searched and which crewmembers are responsible for conducting the search of the defined areas. The checklist also provides confirmation to the pilot in command that a search has been conducted.

The checklist will be held at the departure station for 24-hours after the flight, copied to the flight envelope and forwarded to the OCC (SHJ).

Aircraft search records are saved to **Centrik** and are available for review by Centrik users with relevant access rights. A backup of all Centrik records is maintained on Centrik cloud storage.

1.7. Practical training

Practical training is mandatory and shall be conducted only after the successful completion of the theoretical training. The practical training is designed to reinforce the theoretical knowledge and ensure that personnel are able to correctly apply aircraft security search procedures in an operational environment.

Personnel shall demonstrate the required level of competence during the practical training before being considered qualified to perform aircraft security searches independently.

B747-400 AIRCRAFT SECURITY SEARCH CHECKLIST ON THE GROUND

Flight №:	**A/C type: B-747**	**Reg. №:**
Origin of previous flight	**Departure airport:**	**Destination airport:**
DATE:	**SEARCH COMPLETION TIME:**	
AIRCRAFT INTERNAL INSPECTION:		
√ Inspection performed	*A/C inspection area*	
TO BE COMPLETED BY PILOT (CPT OR FO)		
1. Flight crew compartment:		
☐ Seats		
☐ Between the seats and between the seat and the wall		
☐ Behind seats		
☐ Seat pockets (if applicable)		
☐ Entire floor including area forward of the rudder pedals and beneath all seats		
☐ Ceiling, side and rear wall		
☐ Pedestal and consoles		
☐ Windshield		
☐ All instrument and switch panels		
☐ All circuit breaker fuse panels		
☐ Coat locker		
☐ Ash trays		
☐ Flight library stowage		
☐ Life jacket stowage		
☐ Spare lamp stowage		
☐ Crew oxygen masks stowage		
☐ Emergency door and mechanism		
AS A RESULT OF INSPECTION, PROHIBITED OR SUSPICIOUS (NOT IDENTIFIED) OBJECTS WERE NOT DETECTED		
Crew cabin search performed by:	*Name of the pilot*	*Signature*
TO BE COMPLETED BY LOADMASTER		
1. Main deck cargo compartment:		
☐ Loadmaster work place and the adherent zone		
☐ The consoles for technical documentation		
☐ The floor and the cargo equipment		
☐ The ramp, in the visual examination accessible places		
☐ The ceiling and the equipment placed on it, available for visual examination		
☐ Check cargo restraint nets and inspect all areas		
☐ Check removable divider nets		
☐ Check items contained within the hold		
2. Lower deck cargo compartment:		
☐ With containers removed, check all areas, floor, walls, ceiling		
☐ Unzip flexible panels and inspect areas inside		
☐ Check opening under catwalk platforms		
☐ Check items contained within the hold		

AS A RESULT OF INSPECTION, PROHIBITED OR SUSPICIOUS (NOT IDENTIFIED) OBJECTS WERE NOT DETECTED		
Cargo compartment search performed by:	*Name of the loadmaster*	*Signature*

TO BE COMPLETED BY AIRCRAFT ENGINEER
AIRCRAFT INTERIOR
1. Toilet:
☐ Remove soiled and waste materials if not previously removed
☐ Remove and inspect containers under the sink
☐ Inspect sink and area around sink
☐ Towel container
☐ Tissue dispenser
☐ Toilet seat and lid
☐ Mirror and compartment
☐ Ceiling walls and floor
☐ Door
2. Galley complex:
☐ Remove and inspect all drawer surfaces (inner and outer)
☐ Open and inspect all panels/compartments
☐ All accessible buffet surfaces
☐ Waste container
☐ Ceiling, walls and floor
3. Electrical and equipment compartments:
☐ Check shelves and all surfaces of equipment for foreign objects or materials
☐ Check all areas, floor, walls, ceiling

AS A RESULT OF INSPECTION, PROHIBITED OR SUSPICIOUS (NOT IDENTIFIED) OBJECTS WERE NOT DETECTED		
Aircraft internal and external search performed by:	*Name of the aircraft engineer*	*Signature*

---------- End of the Module 10 ----------

Module 19 – Handling of Potentially Disruptive Passengers

Module 19 – Handling of Potentially Disruptive Passengers

(Cargo Airline Context – Security Awareness)

Scope and Applicability
The procedures described in this module are applicable to passenger airline operations and are included for general security awareness purposes.

THE AIRLINE is a cargo airline and does NOT carry passengers. As such, the procedures described in this module are not applicable to THE AIRLINE operations, but are presented to ensure the basic definitions are known.

Definitions

Potentially disruptive passenger	Unruly passenger
passenger who is either deported, or has been prohibited by the competent authorities from entering the territory of a state (INAD), or is detained according to the law.	The term unruly or disruptive passenger refers to any passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct while on board an aircraft or refuses to follow the instructions of crew members, thereby disturbing good order and discipline.

Inadmissible passenger - INAD
→ person whose access to the territory of the Republic of Moldova is prohibited by its authorized authorities.

Deported person (DEPU / DEPA)
→ person who has entered, legally or illegally, the territory of a state and who, based on the decisions of the competent authorities, is to leave the territory of that state.

Person subject to an arrest warrant
→ a person for whom an arrest warrant has been issued and is currently valid.

The term unruly or disruptive passenger refers to any passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct while on board an aircraft or refuses to follow the instructions of crew members, thereby disturbing good order and discipline.

Examples of unruly conduct include an assault on crew members or passengers, refusal to follow a lawful instruction by the aircraft commander, illegal drug consumption, refusal to stop smoking or consuming alcohol, vandalism, unauthorized use of electronic devices or any other act that could jeopardize the safety of passengers, crew or aircraft.

General Procedures for the Treatment of Unruly Passengers

In passenger airline operations, the treatment of unruly or potentially disruptive passengers may include, depending on the level of threat:

a) application of self-protection and self-defense measures by the crew;
b) use of restraint devices, when necessary;
c) implementation of standard unruly passenger procedures;
d) assessment of the level of disturbance to public order and appropriate response actions;
e) conflict management techniques;
f) reporting procedures and follow-up actions;
g) completion of an incident report following a disturbance of public order;
h) coordination with State law enforcement authorities.

Crew Roles and Responsibilities

(General Passenger Aviation Context)

In passenger operations, the crew is responsible for:

- preventing escalation of disruptive behavior;
- maintaining the safety and security of the aircraft and its occupants;
- notifying the operator and the Pilot-in-Command;
- providing accurate and complete information related to the incident.

Applicability to THE AIRLINE

THE AIRLINE operates cargo-only flights and does not transport passengers.
Therefore:

- unruly or potentially disruptive passengers are not accepted on board;
- procedures related to passenger handling, restraint, notification, or deportation do not apply;
- security-related situations are limited to crew members, authorized personnel, and cargo.

This module is included solely to meet general aviation security training requirements and to promote awareness of threats within the broader civil aviation environment.

--------- End of the Course Book ---------